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The present paper intends to enlighten a particular aspect of charitable organizations which is their 
registration in the regional lists for voluntary organizations.  The aforementioned decision ruled that 
these organizations are entitled to adopt the form of cooperative society and consequently, when all the 
other legal requirements are complete, charitable organizations are to be enrolled.  The registration has 
been subject to many criticisms and it is necessary to bring some light on a topic that hides behind it 
many legal and cultural repercussions concerning the role and the activities of nonprofit organizations 
in the Italian context. 
 
PREMISE 
 
By the Act of 11 August 1991, n.266, called "The Act on charitable organizations",1
 
 the Italian 
Parliament, though recognising that these organizations can be entitled to many benefits if they are 
registered in the regional lists, actually gave a great deal of importance and emphasis to the whole 
procedure of establishment of such organizations and, above all, to the to the control that the 
administrative authority exercise upon those organizations which apply for registration. 
By taking the aforesaid decision, the Administrative Court of Lombardy according to section 3 of the 
Act of 1991 which states that charitable organizations are left free to adopt any legal form they regard 
as most appropriate for their purposes ruled that these organizations are also entitled to adopt the form 
of the cooperative society in order to fulfil their charitable objective as provided for by the very section 
mentioned above.  The present paper is concerned with the analysis about the extend to which such a 
decision might represent a extensive interpretation of the provision according to which the legal forms 
to be adopted by nonprofit organization are absolutely free from any boundaries. 
 
The first statement that seems to confirm what has been just said could come directly from the Act of 8 
November 1991, n.381 concerning the so called "social cooperatives".  This Act expressly provides 
that a cooperative society can be also used for purposes other than mutual and precisely for purposes to 
be reached "for the general interest of the community towards human promotion and social .... of 
citizens". 
                                                     
1  For a first and general comment on this Act see M. COSTANZA, in Corr.Giur., 1991.p.1074 ff.; for a detailed and 
more complete analysis of the same Act see V.ITALIA, Il volontariato, (Milan, 1992) 
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That which has been said so far is the necessary theoretical stratum to ascertain which company forms 
can be adopted by charitable organizations in the Italian system. 
 
1. PURPOSES AND STRUCTURE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Section 2 of the Act of 1991 provides that according to the very Act the term "voluntary activity" is to 
be interpreted as that activity which is supplied in a personal, spontaneous and free manner, by means 
of the organization which the volunteer belongs to, without perusing any profitable object neither 
direct nor indirect and exclusively for solidarity purposes".  Once the non profit purpose of voluntary 
organizations has been affirmed, and consequently once one of the characterising factor of nonprofit 
organizations has been identified, the law provision mentioned above adds that the voluntary activity 
has to be exclusively directed to solidarity purposes.  This last formula seems to be even more general 
and ambiguous if they regard the different aspects that are hidden behind the concept of solidarity in 
the present cultural context.  On the one side, the lack of a profitable objective immediately defines the 
class of associations that do not comply with the traditional company criteria.  On the other side, the 
definition of solidarity purposes implies a multiplicity of interventions that are different from one 
another because of the internal or external destination of the activity that they carry out.  Beside the 
typical solidarity of the trade union, which carry out their activities in favour of the workers who are 
registered with the trade unions themselves, there is also a kind of solidarity that involves associations, 
foundations, syndicates, clubs the members or beneficiaries of which are characterised by the same 
peculiar interest.  Furthermore, there is a kind of solidarity that we could define in the strict sense 
which is performed by organizations having different cultural and ideological background in favour of 
those individuals who have less means to led a sufficient standard of life and therefore are the least 
protected in the collectivity.  Therefore, mutual benefit charitable organizations are opposed to public 
benefit charitable organizations the activity of which is not directed towards a well defined group of 
individuals but they supply their services to the whole community or remarkable section of it.  In this 
respect, one could rightly affirm that to confine "social" solidarity the content of the provisions of the 
Act of 1991 could be reductive and excessively discretionary.2
                                                     
2  N. RICCARDELLI, in Giur. Comm., 1993, II.p.643 ff. 
  The definition that is contained in 
section 2, subsection 1, though the literal content suggests the word "exclusively" is to be regarded as 
not exclusive because the legislator intended to 
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further stress the fact that charitable organizations do not have a proper subjective profitable 
characteristics. 
 
If the solidarity purpose was to be a general concept not being able to define anything it would not 
only identify the charitable organizations as strictly regarded but any organization carrying out its 
activities without pursuing any profit at all, whatever its purpose may be.  Therefore, I think we can 
affirm that the private dimension of the solidarity activity is not opposed to its public role since its 
contribution seems to be consistent with the public purposes, whether social or civil or cultural that 
represent the main legal reason which supports the whole life of non profit organizations.  According 
to a certain view, which springs from a decision of the Italian Supreme Court, the notion of "solidarity 
purpose" that defines charitable organizations according to section 3 of the Act of 1991, is identified 
with a "style of life" which in itself could be expressed in any particular objective if it is directed 
towards individuals at large, that is towards the outside.3
 
  This would imply that the solidarity 
purposes would not be identifiable and therefore not completely similar to the charitable organizations 
strictly defined, that is those which supply the traditional services in favour of the individuals most in 
need.  According to this reasoning, the specific definition that the legislator intended to apply would 
arise many questions for the scholar about the exact place to be given to solidarity purposes within 
charitable organizations. 
On the one hand, should the intention of the legislator have been to underline the necessity for 
voluntary organizations to be non profit associations, by requiring the solidarity purpose the Act of 
1991 would introduce any novelty as to the definition of these organizations.  Indeed, if the essential 
factor of the organizations mentioned above should be identified with the solidarity function that is 
obviously opposed to the profitable one so much so that the pursuing of the latter is to be expressly 
prohibited in the Memorandum of Association or in the Articles of Association, the provisions of the 
Act of 1991 would seem to be an answer to the exigency of strengthening the non profit factor rather 
than taking into account a further difference with business corporations.  On the other hand, if the 
Italian legislator should have intended to regulate a specific aspect of voluntary organizations, the Act 
would have not only confirmed such provision in other sections of the very Act but it would also have 
endeavoured to define the term "solidarity purpose" in a better way.  Consequently, given the implicit 
difficulty of tracing back to a unmistakable definition of the concept of solidarity as previously stated, 
the Act appears to refer to a proper way of being of voluntary organizations and not to a well 
determined are in which they carry out their activities. 
 
2. SUPREME COURT: DECISION OF 28 FEBRUARY 1992, N.75 
 
The decision represents an important point of reference in order to better comprehend the phenomenon 
of non-profit organizations and especially their purposes relating to the role that is attributed to them in 
the context of the modern states.  On that occasion, the judges of the Supreme Court established their 
decision exactly on the fact that solidarity purposes and volunteering are two inseparable elements of 
                                                     
3  L.BRUSCUGLIA, La Legge sul Volontariato. Analisi & Commento Giuridico, (Padua, 1993), p.9. 
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the same body that is the non-profit organization.  The Supreme Court ruled that volunteering is "[...] a 
way of being of the person within social relationship, or otherwise, a paradigm of social action which 
is likely to refer to single individuals or associations composed of several people" and that "as such" 
volunteering "runs away from any rigid classification regarding province, in the sense that is may find 
space and may be realized within any material field of community life [...]".  From these statements 
one may infer that volunteering represents a mode by which single individuals or groups of people, 
which cannot be denied either to come out of private imitative or deprived from their public function 
by virtue of the fact that their activity and services are directed towards the outside world so as to 
match those needs that can be defined as social at large, cooperate to the fulfilment of those goals that 
are typical of an organized community.  Voluntary organizations and therefore, the multiplicity of 
aggregative forms that spring out from the community, represent the means by which citizens can take 
effectively part in the political, economic and social organization of the country.  Furthermore, they 
cooperate to realize public goals and to pursue the interests that the State and the other public 
administrations locate according to Section 2 of the Italian Constitutional Charter.  The full and 
complete realization of these organizations comes within the general context of the inviolable human 
rights which recognise and guarantee dignity to man both as single individual both as together with 
other fellows in social forms in which he/she can develop their personality.  In this respect, the 
Supreme Court also affirms such concept in the abovementioned decision: "[...] As fundamental model 
of the positive and responsible action of man who commits himself spontaneously and freely in favour 
of other individuals or in favour of collective interests worthy to be guaranteed [..] volunteering 
represents the most immediate expression of the primary social vocation of man, deriving from the 
original identification of the single individual with the social forms in which he can develop his 
personality and from the subsequent link of active belonging that connects man to the community of 
men.  [Volunteering] is, in other words, the most direct realization of the principle of social solidarity, 
according to which each person is called to act not because of a utilitaristic return or because they are 
compelled to do so by an authority, but because of free and spontaneous expression of the deep social 
attitude of human beings.  By implying the original connotation of man uti socius, this principle is 
included among the basic values of Italian legal system[..] Volunteering partakes in the nature of such 
fundamental rights: it takes part in it as a dialectic position intended to overcome the atomistic limit of 
individual freedom, in the sense that volunteering is an expression of this freedom that leads each 
single person on the road of the building of new relationships and links among men beyond the ties 
coming from public duties or authority commands". 
 
The aforementioned decision, therefore, seems susceptible to be accepted where it seems to confirm 
that volunteering is, above all, an individual expression of the value of solidarity, and only, at a further 
level (but not necessarily) the associate expression of the value of same value, by defining it rightly, a 
way of being of each person, fundamental model of the positive and responsible action of single 
individuals and immediate image of the original social vocation of man.4
                                                     
4  Ibid, p.10. 
  Consequently, the Court 
stated both the individual and organized value of voluntary organizations by expressly recognising a 
new way of accomplishing with the supreme constitutional duties and of taking part in the life of the 
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country. 
 
3. THE DOCTRINE POINT OF VIEW 
 
The law cases are followed by the doctrine that seems to sustain that by "the Act of 1991 the legislator 
expressly underlined the social and moral value of free non profit voluntary associations as means 
necessary for the growth of society, for the development of democratic rules, for progress intended to 
reach more substantial objectives of equality and participation of citizen".5
                                                     
5  On this issue, see L.MORABITO, Legge-quadro sul volontariato n. 266 dell'II agosto 1991. Luci e ombre, in Riv. 
amm., 1992,p.33. 
  On the contrary, the 
dominant doctrine seems to support the view according to which the Act of 1991 rules only the 
traditional and organized voluntary associations, that are mainly represented by large organizations 
working in relief, charitable or philanthropic areas.  The approach of the Act of 1991 to a dynamic and 
ever increasing phenomenon such as volunteering appears to be ultimately defined by the extremely 
static approach of the legislator that does not seem to take into consideration flexible experiences 
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that reveal themselves precious in many social situation such as home care, elderly and handicapped 
people relief, etc.6
 
  
Consequently, it seems as though there exists a kind of rigidity in the process of defining what 
voluntary organizations are.  This difficulty could make it harder for those groups which are less 
organized on steady basis to be enrolled in the enrolled in the regional registers.  In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that Section 3 of the Act of 1991 provides that the compulsion providing for the drafting of 
the balance-sheet does not apply to the informal or the least formalized groups, which, according to 
some recent survey, seem to represent not less than 20% of the whole Italian voluntary organizations.  
However, another survey underlines the novelty that the legislator introduced as to the term used to 
refer to the associations carrying out charitable purposely the term "organization".  Indeed, this term 
includes a wider range of groups than the traditional concept of "board" or "organ" since it allows for a 
ample freedom of legal forms even though it does not seem to be able to solve positively the question 
about the least formalized organising forms. 
 
By moving from the "open" concept of organization and taking into account the lack of a specific 
definition of organization itself, one might also affirm that should the requirement of "solidarity 
purpose" become a less distinct concept, lacking effective defining capacities, it would follow that any 
organization, for any working scope, including cultural, sport and recreational objectives, should 
regard itself as a voluntary organization with all the benefits and law facilities that come from legal 
recognition.  In this direction, it is important to stress that it is not the sole natural thrust of the 
organizations, which aim to be enrolled in the regional registers so as to benefit from the facilities 
provided for by the law, to justify the interpretation above mentioned but also the nature and structure 
of several collective organizations that though they are interested in benefiting from the different tax 
and law treatment, they are above all interested in being recognised their activity towards the outside 
and therefore being recognised their solidarity nature. 
 
From this point of view, the notion of solidarity, as has been already referred to, would acquire a wide 
meaning so as to identify any non profit organization that pursues a scope that the law regards as 
worthy to be protected and subsequently of public utility.  In this respect, any possible objection about 
the possibility for the law of admitting any voluntary organization or those having solidarity purposes 
would cease to exist.  In opposition to the dominant position of the great majority of the legal doctrine 
upon this issue,7
                                                     
6  See L.BOCCACIN, La sinergia della differenza. Un'analisi socilogica del terzo settore in Italia, (Milan, 1993), p.83. 
volunteering cannot be regarded as either as a goal, because it necessarily represents a 
particular way of accomplishing with the objective to match with social needs, or a mode by which to 
replace the loopholes of the Welfare State.  The Act of 1991 clearly intended to regulate in a confining 
manner the voluntary phenonemon so as to make non profit organizations subject to a welfare state 
which more than once has been showing its structural and cultural deficiencies.  We are not talking 
about either "functionalization" or "institutionalisation" of volunteering but certainly we are referring 
7  See COSTANZA, op.cit., p.1074. The author seems to deny that organizations directed to fulfil educational, cultural 
and scientific purposes many be recognised as voluntary organizations by the law. 
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to a reduction of the contribution of non profit associations that are obliged to comply with provisions 
which often only the historical and traditional organizations are capable of fulfilling.  From this it 
follows that the provisions of the Act of 1991 are insufficient because they do not provide for 
associations or foundations that though having different dimension and structure, do take actively part 
in the production and supply of public utilities.8
 
  
Accordingly, one could infer that the solidarity purpose cannot define only some organizations and not 
others because the solidarity objective is the very foundation of non profit groups even of those which 
are not established on a organized structure.  In this respect, it is noteworthy that voluntary 
organizations might adopt a legal from that is not provided for by the Italian Civil Code because in the 
Italian legal system there is not the principle according to which aggregative forms have to assume a 
typical structure.  In this case, the term "organization" that the legislator introduced is to be interpreted 
so as to allow for widest freedom of the private initiative in the choice, that is in the creation, of the 
legal form that is regarded as most adequate and responding to the purpose to be achieved.  As it often 
occurs in Italian legal system, the activities that are supplied by single individuals or by means of 
forms which are different from those organized on a more steady basis are considered to be a way in 
which social participation and solidarity can be effectively performed.  Yet, on the other hand, since 
the other forms of voluntary 
                                                     
8  We are not dealing here, as has been supported by MARIANI (in BRUSCUGLIA, op.cit., p.19), with the question 
relating to the identification of the common element of voluntary organizations with the voluntary labour, but with the 
problem concerning the provision of elastic formulas that allow easier procedures of granting of incorporation that, 
within the wide range of non profit activities may facilitate and sustain with greater commitment those associations that 
appear to work in particularly important and social areas of the entire community. This does not imply by any means to 
introduce a sort of "positive" discrimination but simply to attribute to some organizations and activities a priority in the 
realization of programmes and projects. Simultaneously, all non profit projects should be recognised the same dignity 
both from the substantial and formal point of view. 
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associations than those legally provided for do not represent the subject of the aforementioned Act 
they represent a phenomenon that goes beyond the actual law. 
 
On principle, if there are not further qualifying elements, any voluntary organization which is freely 
established could adopt any legal form compatible with the organizing structure: association, 
foundation, club, company.  These legal forms should instead be characterised by the lack of profitable 
purposes and more precisely by the non distribution for those who somehow control over the 
organization.  The combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3 of the Act of 1991 seems to support 
the idea that the voluntary activity is defined by the lack of profitable objective, even indirect.  Thus, 
volunteering would adopt any legal organization upon the condition that the Memorandum of 
Association and the Articles of Association provide for the nondistribution constraint.  Yet the lack of 
profitable purposes does not seem to be relevant for the legislator of 1991 because the Act does not 
mention such requirement as premise for the organization to adopt a particular legal form instead of 
another one. 
 
On the contrary, in the respect the Circular of the Minister of Finance of 25 February 1992, n. 3 read 
that the lack of profitable purpose makes it impossible for the voluntary organizations provided for by 
the Act of 1991 to adopt, for tax purposes, the form of company "given in particular the fact that 
Section 2247 of the Civil Code provides that the company contract implies the common enterprise of 
an economic business so as to divide the profits".  This circular excluded therefore also cooperative 
societies from the legal forms that voluntary organizations can adopt, thus reaffirming the 
incompatibility of any direct benefit or utility that members could obtain with the solidarity purposes 
stated in the Act of 1991, n.299.9
 
  Consequently, the Minister contributed to limit the sphere of the 
legal forms that voluntary organizations can adopt: "solidarity purpose" becomes then a negative 
requirement without which the very organization could not be freely established. 
4. THE FREE CHOICE OF THE AGGREGATIVE FORMS ACCORDING TO THE ACT 
ON THE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS 
 
As has been already pointed out, Section 3, sub-section 2 of the Act of 1991 stated that voluntary 
organizations can adopt "the legal form that they regard as most suitable for their purposes except the 
compatibility limitation regarding the solidarity purpose".  The latter therefore operates as the ultimate 
reason for the action of voluntary organizations which will not adopt the form of company or 
cooperative society as the doctrine seems to sustain.10
                                                     
9  The complete text of the aforementioned Circular is contained in ITALIA, op.cit., 327. Contra see Consiglio di Stato, 
18 December 1991, n.2980, in Nuova giur. vic. comm., 1992, I,p.49 ff., with the comment of A. FUSARO. 
  Consequently, the legislator, after providing 
that voluntary organizations can adopt any legal form that they consider to be consistent with the 
organization's purpose, it seems to refer generally to the legal precepts spectrum of the reference 
appears to be favourable for the voluntary organizations already established that would not be 
10  A. FUSARO, L'art. 17 cod. civ. e le associazioni "di volontariato" non riconosciute, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 
1992.I,p.499. 
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compelled to transform their legal form since they should adapt it to the new Act.11On the other hand, 
should Section 3 of the Act of 1991 be interpreted extensively it would inevitably imply to legitimate 
the establishing of several aggregative forms distinct from the traditional and generally ones because 
of the lack of profitable purposes.  In this respect, although in principle the legislator seems to 
recognise that both associations and foundations can be used as legal forms to establish voluntary 
organizations, the favour of the Act of 1991 seems to be directed towards the incorporated and 
unincorporated associations.  Thus, the foundation, which has been traditionally structured as a 
complex of asserts to be used for the realization of a particular purpose exclusively stated by the 
founder, does not seem to be consistent with the democratic character that the Act of 1991 required for 
voluntary organisations.12Some scholars assume that the peculiar character of foundations, that is the 
complex of assets destined to a purpose, represents a secondary importance because the Act of 1991 
clearly provides for the necessity of the dominant and main contribution of personal and free activities 
supplied by the members.13
 
  These affirmations are opposed to the idea according to which the 
intention of the legislature of 1991, like the English legal system, was to street the purposes that the 
organization intends to pursue rather than to come to a stringent definition of the legal structure that 
the organization itself would adopt.  Although the Act of 1991 did not expressly refer to any particular 
legal from the fact that foundations are excluded from the consistent legal forms lead scholars to 
sustain that only and exclusively associations respond to the legal requirements provided for by the 
aforementioned Act.  It follows that the choice that parties are given to determine the legal form for 
voluntary organizations is confirmed to the granting of legal personality.  The legislator, therefore, did 
not refer to the wider term of non-profit organizations, within which many aggregative forms would 
have been included because of the common lack of profitable purposes even though having different 
structure.  From the combined reading of the sections of the Act of 1991 it seems to follow that the 
legislature intended to provide for a new type of aggregative body, as it occurred when sport 
associations and social cooperative societies were established.  Consequently, the Act of 1991 did not 
simply recall one of the traditional legal form provided for by the law the Articles of Association of 
which would compulsory include some specific classes such as the solidarity purpose, the prevalent 
contribution of members by means of free labour, the open and democratic structure of the 
organization. 
In conclusion, though the legislator intended to give parties a wide freedom of choice as to the legal 
form to be adopted in order to fulfil the purposes peculiar to voluntary organizations, the Act of 1991 
did indeed subject such freedom to a series of heavy limitations.  The internal democratic character 
and the personal sharing of members of the voluntary activities seems to lead to exclude that those 
                                                     
11  Thus, M.D. STALTERI, Riflessioni su un recente modello di legisazione, in GLI ENTI "NON PROFIT" IN ITALIA, 
by G. PONZANELLI, (Milan, 1994). 
12  See M.GORGONI, in Commentario al cod, civ., by Scialoja e Branca, (Bologna-Roma, 1976), who is in favour of a 
foundation form in which both the relevant contribution of voluntary labour of members of a the democratic character 
mentioned above are provided for. 
13  G. PONZANELLI, Nuove figure e nuove problematiche degli enti "non profit",  in GLI ENT "NON PROFIT". 
NUOVE FIGURE. NUOVE PROBLEMATICHE. Giornate di studio organizzate dal Comitato Regionale Notarile 
Lombardo, (Milan, 1993). 
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who promote a voluntary organization may adopt, or even deliberately create, a legal structure that 
would be new and would not come within the forms already provided for by the law.  It seems 
therefore logic to state along with other scholars,14
                                                     
14   RICCARDELLI, op.cit., p.657 ff. 
 that the intention of the legislator (voluntas legis) 
which appears to affirm freedom of association concerning the realization of a public scope became an 
ambiguous statement that is not easy to understand.  However not only is such intention subject to 
many different interpretations but it also automatically reduced the sphere of intervention and contract 
of members of voluntary organizations. 
